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vice is assessed; secondly, the provider must be compensated for this cost.
We argue that this procedure is problematic because the implementation
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1 Introduction and summary
Universal Service Obligations (USO) are a standard practice in many industries
including telecommunications, energy and postal services. USO can be broadly
divided into two categories: quality obligations (e.g. minimum quality stan-
dards, ubiquity of service) and price obligations (e.g. uniform and affordable
pricing). USO do not attract much attention when the industry is organized as
a (possibly regulated) monopoly. Indeed, when the Universal Service Provider
(USP) is a monopolist, USO are self-financed by internal cross-subsidies: the
profits realized on the profitable market segments finance the losses made on the
loss-making segments that the USP must serve as part of the USO. However,
the coexistence of USO with competition resulting from the current trend in
market liberalization is more problematic. Competition erodes the USP’s profit
and, eventually, threatens the financial viability of the USP, who might not be
able to sustain the same standard of service in a liberalized market as under a
monopoly.
In order to maintain the universal service in a competitive environment, the
design of an appropriate USO funding mechanism may be necessary. A standard
approach to the financing issue is to evaluate the net cost of the universal
service to its provider using an appropriate methodology. Based on this cost
estimate, the need for a funding mechanism is then assessed and, if necessary,
an appropriate funding scheme is chosen and implemented. This is the approach
typically followed by the European Commission for the postal sector.
”Where a Member State determines that the universal service obli-
gations entail a net cost, calculated taking into account Annex I,
and represent an unfair financial burden on the universal service
provider(s), it may introduce: (a) a mechanism to compensate the
undertaking(s) concerned from public funds; or (b) a mechanism for
the sharing of the net cost of the universal service obligations be-
tween providers of services and/or users.” (Third postal directive
(2008/6/EC), Article 7, §3)
This paper shall set out the argument that whenever option (b) is retained,
this two-step approach is misleading because it fails to recognize the distortions
induced by any sharing mechanism of this kind. More specifically, compen-
sating the USP on the basis of an estimated net cost of the USO is likely to
be inappropriate whenever the levied tax modifies the behavior of the market
participants.
An extreme example of this is provided by the Finnish postal market, which
has been fully liberalized since 1994. The regulator has imposed a licensing
system, and accordingly any alternative postal service provider operating in
densely populated areas only would have to pay a fee. This fee aims to ensure
that high quality services are also provided in sparsely populated areas. In
practice, this fee is so high that it effectively constitutes an entry barrier to new
service providers, and as a result the incumbent Finnish postal operator still
enjoys a near monopoly position. Clearly, if this entry fee is based on a USO
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costing exercise, the estimated and actual costs do not correspond because the
costing exercise failed to take into account that the resulting tax is fixed at a
deterrent level.
This paper argues that a USO funding mechanism modifies firms’ behavior.
Such funding schemes tends to partially shelter the incumbent from competition,
and consequently the USP collects a higher profit in a funded scenario. A
compensation equal to the estimated net cost of the USO therefore leads to an
overcompensation of the USP, which is effectively paid twice: first, it is fully
compensated for the net service cost by the funding mechanism, and second,
it is sheltered from competition and thereby able to collect additional profits.
The additional profits made by the USP should be accounted for as part of the
USO funding mechanism; accordingly, the tax collected should be inferior to the
estimated cost of the USO. In other words, the USO costing exercise cannot be
separated from its funding.
Using the profitability cost approach to estimate the net cost of the USO
(Panzar, 2000 and Cremer et al., 2000), this paper illustrates that the cost of the
USO is endogenous to its funding and, incidentally, smaller in the presence of
a cost-sharing mechanism. Taking this into account, an appropriate compensa-
tion for the true cost of the USO is equivalent to the adoption of a competitive
neutrality criterion, where the profits of the USP in a funded USO scenario
are equal to some benchmark level computed in an unsubsidized market sce-
nario (Panzar, 2000) with competition but without USO. This study will then
demonstrate that a tax level compatible with both competition in the market
and competitive neutrality always exists.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the model and
introduce four relevant market scenarios: monopoly and USO (M), competition
without USO (C), competition with USO (U) and competition with a funded
USO (F ). Section 4, discusses the scope for evaluating the cost of USO ex-
ante, i.e. independently of its possible financing; and several possible measures
are discussed. Section 5 argues that the ex-ante cost of USO should not serve
as a basis for determining the level of compensation, introduces a competitive
neutrality criterion to determine the tax level that will ensure adequate com-
pensation; additionally demonstrating that this compensation level exists and
is compatible with competition in the market. Finally section 6 concludes the
study.
2 The Model
The model used is standard and similar to Valletti et. al (2002). There are
two firms: the incumbent, firm I, and the entrant, firm E, potentially selling
differentiated products or services to a continuum [0, N ] of independent local
markets. To serve consumers in any local market n ∈ [0, N ], a firm must incur
a sunk connection cost g(n) and markets are ordered by increasing connection
costs. Furthermore, it is assumed that g(0) ≥ 0 and ∂g(·)∂n > 0 for all n ∈ [0, N ].
Except for this fixed connection cost, all local markets are identical.
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A maximum of two firms are active in each local market. Firms play a
two-stage game, first choosing their market coverage and then simultaneously
setting prices. Firms cover a closed subset of the local markets starting from
the cheapest location. Coverage decisions are represented by ni and ne, where
nk is the index of the last market covered by firm k. Without loss of generality,
the assumption is that the incumbent has a larger coverage that the entrant:
ne ≤ ni. It is therefore possible to distinguish between three kinds of local
markets: duopoly markets in [0, ne], monopolized markets in [ne, ni], and non-
covered markets in [ni, N ].
In a monopolized market, consumer demand is defined by xmi (pi) with
∂xmi (·)
∂pi
< 0. In a duopoly market, firms sell differentiated products, so demands
are respectively defined as xj(pj , pk) with
∂xj(·)
∂pj
< 0 and ∂xj(·)∂pk > 0.
1 Demand
functions are twice continuously differentiable. Firms produce at a constant
marginal cost c > 0. pimi (pi), pi
d
i (pi, pe) and pi
d
e (pi, pe) denotes the operating
profit made by firm k = i, e in a monopoly (subscript ’m’) and a duopoly mar-
ket (subscript ’d’). The assumption is that ∂
2pidk(·)
∂pk∂pl
> 0, i.e. prices are strategic
complements. Finally, the assumption is that there exists a unique, interior,
Nash equilibrium in the pricing game taking place in any local market.
USO, if any, are imposed on firm I exclusively. USO are defined here as
comprising two distinct elements: a uniform price constraint (UP) and a cov-
erage constraint (CC).2 The UP is a ban on price discrimination between local
markets. The CC constraint, defined by an upper limit n¯ ≤ N on coverage,
imposes an obligation to serve all markets in [0, n¯]. It is therefore noteworthy
that while local markets are independent from each other without USO (since
marginal costs are constant), this no longer holds true under USO because of the
uniform pricing rule. This strategic link between markets under USO may lead
to the non existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in the price game, especially
if products are not differentiated enough (see Gautier and Wauthy (2010) for
a complete analysis of the implications of USO on equilibrium outcomes). The
focus of the present paper is confined to the original analysis proposed by Val-
letti et al. (2002), focusing on those instances where a pure strategy equilibrium
exists. This is done without loss of generality as the results established by Gau-
tier and Wauthy (2010) (for a scenario in which a mixed strategy equilibrium
prevails) largely confirm those of Valletti et al. (2002).
3 Four market scenarios
In the following section, we will consider four different market scenarios:
1. Monopoly and USO (referred to as M hereafter)
2. Competition without USO (referred to as C hereafter).
1Without loss of generality, the assumption is that ∀p, xmi (p) ≥ xdi (p, pe)
2For the economic foundations of the USO see Cremer et. al, (2001).
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3. Competition with an unfunded USO (referred to as U hereafter)
4. Competition with a funded USO (referred to as F hereafter)
Scenarios M and C are two useful benchmarks, one without competition, the
other without USO. The M scenario corresponds to the old-fashioned organiza-
tion of the universal service where the service provider is granted a monopoly
right to cover the cost of the USO. The C scenario corresponds to a market
situation where the incumbent provider would be relieved from the universal
service constraints while being exposed to competition. This theoretical sce-
nario is often used to gauge the financial burden of the USO in a real-world
situation.
Scenario U describes a liberalized market where the universal service is main-
tained and competition simultaneously takes place. The competitor enters only
in the most profitable local markets, leaving the markets with high connection
costs to the USP. The universal service consequently entails a net cost that
requires accurate measurement. Furthermore, if this cost represents an unfair
burden, the regulator may introduce a compensation mechanism. In order to
finance the USO, regulators face two basic options: use of public funds or cost-
sharing mechanisms. In this paper, we focus on the latter option only. The
principle is as follows: the regulator creates a universal service fund, financed
by taxes levied on market participants, and receipts are used to compensate
the incumbent for the net cost of the USO. Scenario F describes the market
outcome in the presence of such a tax.
3.1 Scenario M
This scenario is based on the premise that the market is not opened to com-
petition yet. The incumbent firm is the sole service provider and services are













Regarding the USO, the scenario assumes that (1) there is a non-empty subset
of markets for which the connection cost exceeds the operating profit, that is
pimi (p
m
i ) < g(n¯) and (2) a monopolist is able to self-finance the USO, Π
M
i ≥ 0.
In the scenario M , loss-making markets that the incumbent must serve as




Under scenario C, firms compete freely and the incumbent can price discriminate
between the monopolized markets (where it charges the monopoly price pmi )and
the duopoly markets. In the latter, the best response functions in prices are
defined as:
φCi (pe) ≡ argmax
pi
pidi , (3)
φCe (pi) ≡ argmax
pe
pide . (4)
The equilibrium prices in the duopoly markets (pCi , p
C
e ) are given by the inter-
section of the best response functions defined in (3) and (4). Firms cover local
markets as long as the equilibrium operating profits cover the connection cost.
Equilibrium coverages (nCi , n
C
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C
i ). (6)
The equilibrium industry structure is characterized by the following 5-tuple of
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Under USO, UP and CC constraints are imposed on the incumbent provider.
The USP must serve each local market, and cannot price discriminate across
them. As a result, a local Nash equilibrium in each market cannot be deter-
mined separately, because the optimal behavior of the incumbent in the duopoly
markets cannot be separated from that applying to the monopolized markets.
Taking the following first order condition, computed on the global profit










The solution to this equation can be denoted by φUi (·). Assuming that this
solution is unique, and furthermore that it defines the true best response func-
tion in the relevant range3, φUi (·) characterizes the incumbent’s best response
function. Firm E’s best response function is not affected by USO, and therefore
φCe (·) still defines the optimal entrant behavior.
3See Gautier and Wauthy (2010) and Valletti et al. (2002).
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The Nash equilibrium resulting from the combination of φUi (·) and φCe (·)
can be denoted by (pUi , p
U
e ). The imposition of a uniform pricing rule relaxes
price competition in the duopoly markets since φUi (·) > φCi (·). The following









Furthermore, from (9), the incumbent’s best price response function φUi (·)
shifts downward when the entrant extends its market coverage: dφUi /dne < 0.
This implies that the equilibrium prices and the profit of firm E in any local
market decrease with the entrant’s coverage. When the entrant extends its
market coverage, it faces a tougher incumbent at the price setting stage. For
this reason, the entrant has a strategic incentive to limit its market coverage.










= g(nUe ). (10)
Note that the effect of USO on ne is ambiguous. Indeed, since price compe-
tition is weaker (φUi > φ
C
i ), local profits for the entrant increase, enabling prof-
itable entry in a larger number of markets. However, the entrant must control
for the incumbent’s aggressiveness by limiting the number of contested markets.
Thus the entrant’s coverage may be higher or lower compared to scenario C.
Industry structure under this scenario is summarized by the 4-tuple (pUi , p
U
e ,


























Being the USP is usually costly, and consequently the USP may be compensated
for the net cost of the USO. The following section will explore ways in which this
cost can be measured. For now, consider that complying with the constraints
UP and CC induces a net cost ∆USO > 0. In practice, regulators agree to
compensate the USP for the net cost of the USO when it represents an unfair
burden for the USP. Criteria used to evaluate the unfairness of the burden vary
across sectors and countries and may not be well defined.4 The scenario below
considers a market where the USP will be compensated for the net cost ∆USO.
In this scenario, the regulator sets a tax τ > 0 and collects an amount
T (τ) ≥ 0 paid to the incumbent as a compensation for being the USP. In this
4See Boldron et al. (2009) and Jaag (2011).
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funded scenario, the regulator must choose the tax base (entry fee, output,
turnover, etc.)5 and the appropriate tax level. Furthermore, the regulator
has the choice between a compensation fund where all the market participants
(including the USP) pay the tax; and a pay-or-play model, where any operator
that provides the universal service is exempt from the tax. If a compensation
fund is selected, the USP must itself partially compensate the net cost of the
USO. For the purposes of this study (unless specified otherwise), a pay-or-play
system will be studied.
In the market scenario F , the regulator decides on the tax level τ before
the entrant decides on its coverage and firms begin to compete on price. The
regulator anticipates all the consequences of the tax and it is therefore able to
fine-tune the tax and to set it at the desired level, for instance at a level τ , such
that the revenue T (τ) is equal to ∆USO.
The following argument will consider the case of an output tax paid by the
entrant to the incumbent. This argument can be replicated for any other tax
base and the special case of the lump-sum entry fee will be specifically addressed
in section 5. In the funded scenario, when an output tax τ ≥ 0 applies, the
entrant’s optimal pricing behavior is defined as:
argmax
pe
pide = (pe − c− τ)xde . (13)
φFe (·) denotes the best response function, corresponding to the solution of
equation (13). This function unambiguously shifts upward relative to scenario
U : φFe (·) ≥ φCe (·) with a strict inequality for τ > 0.





the sum of the operating profits and the net tax proceeds.6 Consequently, the













The last term in (14) captures the impact of a price increase on the tax
proceeds.7 This positive impact makes the USP less aggressive at the price
setting stage and for any given ne, the best response function φFi (·), defined by
(14), shifts upward compared to scenario U : φFi (·) ≥ φUi (·).
In summary:
Lemma 1 Given ne, funding USO with τ > 0 yields φFe (·) ≥ φCe (·) and φFi (·) ≥
φCi (·).
5The choice of a tax base is, in practice, a highly complex question; see the discussion and
examples in Oxera (2007), Borsenberger et al. (2009) and Gautier and Paolini (2011).
6For a given tax level τ , the incumbent’s objective remains unaltered regardless of whether
the system is pay-or-play or compensation fund based, as in the case of a compensation fund
the incumbent pays the tax to itself. The qualitative results derived here are consequently
independent of the mechanism chosen, although the tax level will obviously not be the same.
7This term may be locally equal to zero if the regulator agrees to transfer all the tax
proceeds up to a pre-specified limit, for instance an estimated net cost of the USO. Beyond
this limit, increasing the entrant’s market share would not lead to a higher revenue for the
USP.
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The intuition for Lemma 1 is straightforward. Firm E tends to set higher
prices because of its higher costs, whereas firm I tends to set higher prices
because part of the revenues that are lost by consumers’ displacement are re-
covered through the taxes collected on firm E’s sales. At this stage, the presence
of the unit tax unambiguously relaxes price competition. One may expect that
the entrant’s profit decreases because of the tax, but this is not immediately
obvious, precisely because the presence of the tax induces an upward shift in
φi(·). Moreover, Gautier and Wauthy (2010) show that ∂φi(·)∂ne < 0. As a result,
the first order effect materialized by the shift of φe(·) in Lemma 1 is reinforced
by an upward shift of φi(·) if the extent of market coverage decreases.
The equilibrium prices defined by the combination of φFi (·) and φFe (·) can
be denoted by (pFi , p
F
e ). The incumbent’s coverage is n
F
i = n¯ and the entrant’s
coverage is given by (10).
In the next Lemma we establish the condition under which the equilibrium






e ), decreases with τ . This
condition implies that the entrant’s coverage is lower in scenario F in comparison
with scenario U .
Lemma 2 A sufficient condition for ∂pi
∗
e (·)
∂τ < 0 is
∂pFi
∂τ ≤ 1.
Proof: Relying on the expression of the first order condition for firm E, we
know that, in equilibrium, the following relation is satisfied:
(pe − c− τ)−∂xe(·)
∂pe
= xe.
Developing the condition ∂pi
∗
e (·)
∂τ < 0, results in:





Combining the two previous equations requires:
(pe − c− τ)−∂xe(·)
∂pe





















∂τ < 1 is sufficient to ensure that
∂pi∗e (·)
∂τ < 0 is satisfied.
There are therefore two channels through which τ could induce the incum-
bent to be less aggressive: the strategic effect resulting from the collected tax,
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and the market coverage effect. The following is based on the premise that the
total effect is such that Lemma 2 holds true; and consequently ∂n
F
e
∂τ < 0. Note
that therefore even if ∂p
F
i (·)
∂τ > 1, the entrant’s payoff may decreases with the
level of τ ; this is increasingly likely the more differentiated the products are.8
4 Measuring the net cost of the USO
In this model, complying with the USO is costly for the incumbent because the
additional costs imposed by the USO exceed the additional revenues9. The net
cost of the USO may thus be broadly defined as the cost of conforming to these
obligations. To measure this cost, several methodologies have been proposed;
the net avoided cost (NAC), the entry pricing (Rodriguez and Storer, 2000)
and the profitability cost (Panzar, 2000 and Cremer et al., 2000) are the most
popular methodologies.10 Clearly, the cost of the USO depends on the way it is
measured.
The NAC is an accounting exercise based on scenario M , and consists of
identifying the unprofitable submarkets for which the incremental cost exceeds
the incremental revenue.11 The NAC of the USO is then the additional profit
that the USP would be able to achieve if it were relieved from the USO and was





g(n)dn− (n¯− n˜)pimi (pmi ), (15)
where n˜ < n¯ is defined as pimi (p
m
i ) = g(n˜). The NAC has been criticized on the
grounds that it is essentially a static approach that fails to take into account
possible changes in market structure. The other methods consider the issue of
market structure explicitly as they are both based on the comparisons of two
different market scenarios.
The entry pricing approach compares the scenarios M and U . The entry cost
of the USO is equal to the lost revenues for the incumbent on the nUe contested
markets where entry occurs, minus the impact of entry on the incumbent’s total
cost. Including the variation in the total cost after entry is particularly relevant
when there are economies of scale. Formally, the entry pricing cost of the USO
is defined as:




i )− pidi (pUi , pUe )]− (n¯− nUe )c[xmi (pmi )− xmi (piU )]. (16)
8See Anderson et al. (2001) for a detailed analysis of the conditions on demand primitives
such that the presence of a uniform tax may induce a profit increase.
9Including the possible intangible revenues of being recognized as the USP.
10In all these approaches, it is assumed that the USP is an efficient operator i.e. costs are
best practice costs. Thus, in principle, the net cost of the USO does not include any cost due
to productive inefficiency.
11Distinguishing profitable and unprofitable products is far from obvious when there are
common costs that must be allocated (see Pearsall, 2009 for a recent contribution).
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Finally, the profitability cost approach is based on a comparison of the incum-
bent’s profit in the scenarios U and C.12 The resulting profit for the incumbent
USP, ΠCi , is then compared with its actual profit in a liberalized market with
USO, ΠUi . The profitability cost of the USO (∆USOpi) is the difference between
these two profit levels:
∆USOpi = ΠCi −ΠUi . (17)
This methodology estimates the loss in profits incurred by the USP specif-
ically due to the USO, independent of the liberalization process, since in both
scenarios the USP faces competition.13
5 Funding USO
5.1 The two-step procedure
A positive net cost of the USO means that complying with the USO is costly
for the service provider, and consequently the USP is eligible for compensation.
The two-step procedure for funding USO consists of firstly identifying the cost
of complying with the USO (using one of the methods described above), and
secondly imposing a tax, τ , on market participants. The tax is set at a level
that guarantees the tax proceeds to be equal to the estimated cost of the USO.
The compensation paid to the USP is equal to the estimated net cost of the
USO.
The following paragraphs set out the argument that whenever the funding of
the USO is based on its estimated cost, be it ∆USONAC , ∆USOep or ∆USOpi,
the USP receives a total compensation above the estimated net cost of the USO.
In other words, a funding exercise based on a prior estimate of the cost of the
USO is inappropriate, overcompensating the USP. As a result, the USO costing
exercise cannot be separated from USO funding exercise, because the cost of
USO compliance is inextricably affected by its funding.
Comparing scenarios U and F has demonstrated that the imposition of a
tax relaxes price competition, with the two firms behaving less aggressively at
the price-setting stage: φFi (·) ≥ φUi (·) and φFe (·) > φUe (·). Furthermore, the
entrant competes on a reduced number of markets nFe < n
U
e . These effects
clearly combine to increase the incumbent’s total profits. We thus have:
Lemma 3 For any τ > 0, ΠFi (·) > ΠUi (·).
In a funded USO scenario, the competitive pressures faced by the incum-
bent are lower and, consequently, its profit increases in comparison with the
12A similar approach is recommended by the European Commission in the Third Postal
Directive (2008/6/EC, Annex I).
13The profitability cost approach does not make any reference to the regulated monopoly
situation (scenario M). Cremer et al. (2000) deconstruct the transition from a monopolized to
a liberalized market as a profitability cost of liberalization. This is measured as the difference
between ΠMi and Π
C





unfunded USO scenario. However, the incumbent additionally receives a com-
pensation that matches the estimated net cost of the USO. The incumbent is
thus funded twice for its universal service provision: it receives a compensation
from the universal service fund, and is also partially sheltered from competition.
The incumbent is clearly over-compensated: the total benefit received by the in-
cumbent exceeds the cost of providing the USO (whichever way it is measured).
Formally, the total compensation received by the USP is ΠFi − ΠUi + ∆USO,
clearly above the estimated cost of the USO.
Proposition 1 To compensate for the net cost of the USO, the tax τ must
satisfy ΠFi −ΠUi + T (τ) = ∆USO and it is immediate that T (τ) < ∆USO.
The two-step procedure is therefore misleading as it fails to account for the
fact that tax proceeds are not the only source of funding. USO funding results
from both the compensation fund and the sheltering of competition. Taxes
should therefore be adjusted downward to take into account the fact that the
funding relaxes the competitive pressures faced by the incumbent.
The argument outlined above is based on the imposition of a distortionary
tax that modifies the pricing behavior of the firms.14 This section will now
consider the case of a fixed entry fee, T ,set at the level of the estimated net cost
of the USO. In this case, the firms’ behavior in scenarios U and F are identical
and the (after-tax) profits of the incumbent and the entrant are respectively
ΠUi + ∆USO and Π
U
e −∆USO. With a lump-sum entry fee, the tax proceeds
are equal to the estimated cost of the USO and the USP is not overcompensated.
This argument holds true as long as the entry fee is not set at an entry deterring
level. Indeed, if ∆USO > ΠUe , the entrant is better off staying out of the market
and the relevant scenario that applies is no longer F or U , but M . When this
condition is not satisfied, the entry fee that fully compensates the incumbent
for the ex-ante cost of USO, T = ∆USO, deters entry. Thus the regulator must
use a distortionary tax to finance the USO, or otherwise simply accepts that no
competition effectively takes place. 15 Finally, notice that if the profitability
cost approach is used to calculate the net cost of the USO, the condition for
entry can be expressed as ΠCi − ΠUi > ΠUe ; that is, the aggregate profit under
USO is higher than the incumbent’s profit in the unregulated case.
14In the European telecommunication sector, most countries with a mechanism to share the
burden of the USO use the turnover or the revenue to determine the contribution to the fund.
15When the two types of taxes are possible, it is not necessarily obvious that the lump-sum
tax is the preferred option. The USO may place the USP at a competitive disadvantage, for
example when some form of uniform pricing is required. A distortive universal service tax
may then be used to countervail the impact of the USO (see the examples in Armstrong, 2001
and Mirabel et al., 2009). For that reason, even if a lump-sum tax is feasible, the regulator
may eventually prefer a distortive tax to place all the competitors on a level playing field. The
choice then depends on the distortive impact of both the set of universal service constraints
and the associated financing.
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5.2 Competitive neutrality
This section highlights the analogy between the above approach to USO fi-
nancing and the concept of competitive neutrality. Competitive neutrality has
often been proposed as a qualifying criterion for the universal service and its
supporting mechanism, especially in telecommunications. In the US, the FCC
requires that the universal service support mechanisms and rules should be com-
petitively neutral. In this context, competitive neutrality means that universal
service support mechanisms and rules neither unfairly advantage nor disadvan-
tage one provider over another. Broadly speaking, the universal service and its
financing are competitively neutral if they do not create a competitive advan-
tage or disadvantage for either the provider or the competitors. One possible
way to interpret this requirement (adopted for instance by Chone´ et al., 2002)
is to require that the profit of the designated provider is at least as big as the
profit it would collect if it were relieved from the USO (in the scenario C).
Adopting the profitability cost approach to measure the USO, the condition
of proposition 1 for an appropriate USO financing can be written as follows:
ΠFi + T (τ) = Π
C
i . (18)
The tax must be set at a level that guarantees to the incumbent a payoff equaling
their payoff in scenario C, with competition but without USO. In other words,
the funding should satisfy the competitive neutrality criterion.
Alternatively, condition (18) could be reinterpreted as follows: the com-
pensation paid by the fund must be equal to the true profitability cost of the
USO, the latter being estimated on the basis of the relevant market scenario F
with funding, rather than on an hypothetical scenario U without funding. Tax
proceeds can be set to equalize the estimated net cost of the USO when it is
recognized that the cost of USO is endogenous to its funding, i.e. computed on
the basis of F .
Notwithstanding the above, there always exists a tax that is compatible with
competitive neutrality (as defined above) and that induces a positive amount of
entry, as demonstrated below:
Proposition 2 Whenever ΠMi > Π
C
i , there exists a τ > 0 such that (i) com-
petitive neutrality can be achieved: ΠFi + T (τ) = Π
C
i and (ii) entry takes place
in the market: nFe > 0.
Proof:(1) Total profits in F never exceeds those of the incumbent in M and
the tax proceeds T cannot exceed the entrant’s profit:
ΠUi + Π
U
e ≤ ΠMi , (19)
ΠUe ≥ T (τ). (20)
Combining the two results in ΠFi + T (τ) ≤ ΠMi .
(2) Using lemma 2 and the envelope theorem, we have ∂Π
F
i
∂τ > 0, with
limτ→0 ΠFi = Π
U




i , where τ¯ is the tax rate that
completely deters entry.
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(3) The tax proceeds are non-negative T (τ) ≥ 0 and continuous in τ .
Combining these three facts, it must be that ΠFi + T (τ) is continuous in
τ and belongs to the closed interval [ΠUi ,Π
M
i ]. Consequently, whenever Π
U
i <
ΠCi ≤ ΠMi , there exists a tax rate τ that satisfies competitive neutrality and
leads to a positive coverage by the entrant.
This study has demonstrated that by utilizing distortive taxes the regulator
is always able to finance the true net cost of the USO, and maintain competition
in the market. This mechanism combines a reduction in competitive pressures
and the funding levied on the industry participants.
5.3 Implications for USO design
This study has additionally demonstrated that the funding of the USO creates
additional distortions as prices increase and the entrant covers fewer markets; in
other words, funding incurs some extra costs in terms of consumer surplus and
welfare. Thus, if one considers the problem of designing the universal service
(a question that is beyond the scope of this paper)16, it is clear that due to
the additional welfare losses specifically created by the funding mechanism, the
scope of the USO will certainly not be extended when a cost-sharing mechanism
is implemented. More specifically, if one considers that the CC constraint, n¯,
that applies in scenario U has been designed in order to maximize welfare, the
regulator is likely to relax the constraint in scenario F as it entails additional
costs. Reducing the scope of the universal service and thus reducing the net
cost of the USO is an additional measure that could be combined with the cost-
sharing mechanism and the associated sheltering of competition effect to sustain
the universal service in a competitive environment.
6 Concluding remarks
Furthermore, this study has demonstrated that an estimated cost of the USO
should be used carefully in any USO policy. In particular, it cannot be used
to determine the size of the universal service fund, because whenever funding
USO requires the use of a tax mechanism, the presence of this tax partly shields
the USP from competition and, as such, already yields a partial compensation
for universal service provision. As a result, compensating the provider to the
level of the ex-ante measured cost would result in over-compensation and would
not be competitively neutral. The benchmark model proposed in this paper has
nevertheless shown that there always exists a tax level that ensures the fund-
ing of USO according to the competitive neutrality criterion, and this funding is
compatible with competition in the market. With an appropriate distortive tax,
it is thus possible to sustain the same standard of universal service in a compet-
itive market. However, this does not mean that the universal service should be
16Crew and Kleindorfer (2006) focus on the accessibility of contact points and show that
it is optimal to reduce the scope of the USO in a competitive environment compared to a
monopoly situation.
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fixed once and for all; market liberalization ultimately changes the USO funding
from internal cross-subsidies in scenario M to explicit inter-industry transfers
in scenario F , with both mechanism having their own welfare cost. For that
reason, market liberalization may call for a redefinition of the universal service
that takes into account the true cost of the USO and its funding. In this last
respect, this study has sought to contribute to the wider debate by pointing out
that the cost of the USO is endogenous to its funding.
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